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益将达到 优化。 后，本文根据实际情况给出中国的应对之道。 
 
 




























After the apparent serene of China-EU trade conflict in the first half of 2007, 
China experienced another intense round of anti-dumping investigation from EU. 
Predictably, EU’s anti-dumping on China is not likely to come to its end in the near 
future but, for a good chance, grow. This seems rather a contradiction to economists’ 
study, which theoretically shows that imposing anti-dumping tariff on Chinese export 
goods harms the whole welfare of the importer. Pure economic approach seems 
helpless in explaining the large discrepancy between theory and the real world. In this 
paper, however, another approach has been attempted to find out the endogenous logic 
behind the discrepancy. The approach used here is political economic analysis frame. 
By examining the political and economic determinants of EU member states’ attitude 
to antidumping, modeling a dynamic game to analyze the political interaction of EU’s 
anti-dumping on China, this paper hopes to find the key. 
First of all, this paper gives an overview of the EU’s anti-dumping legislation 
procedure. It’s found that whether to impose anti-dumping tariff on Chinese product is 
decided not only by EU’s anti-dumping executing organization-- the European 
Commission, but, to a large extent, by Council of the EU, which is composed of 
delegates from all member states. Besides, the definition of antidumping product and 
the rate of anti-dumping tariff are heavily influenced by member states’ attitude 
towards anti-dumping on China. In fact, the attitude of the 27 member states is not 
necessarily the same, some even shows contradict to each other. Therefore, this paper 
creatively sort out four political economic models to include all member states, 
namely, the “Pro-antidumping Model”, “Dis-antidumping Model”, 
“Medi-antidumping Model” and the “Poten-antidumping Model”. Economic and 
Political characteristics of different model states were fully investigated. Given that 
simple majority voting system is adopted by the Council of EU, in order to achieve 
majority, keen gaming is popular among member states of different models and 
different interest groups in each states. Then this paper models a dynamic game, 













take countermeasures, lobbies or gives pressures on interest-relating groups. This will 
result in more fully expressed trade benefit of different model states. Finally, this 
paper gives the detail countermeasures to cope with the problem of EU’s 
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的 8 个月中欧盟对华发起的反倾销立案调查数出人意料地为零。相比 2006 年欧
盟对华反倾销立案调查的“狂风暴雨”，这显得特别异常。2006 年，欧盟发起的




以 2007 年 9 月 4 日对华柠檬酸反倾销立案调查的发起为序幕，接下来的截




























表 1-1 ： 2007 年欧盟对华发起的反倾销调查  
序号 被调查产品名称 涉及调查的国家 立案日期 
1 镀锌板 中国 2007-12-14 
2 钢铁紧固件 中国 2007-11-09 
3 橘子罐头 中国 2007-10-20 
4 铁及非合金钢焊管 中国及其他 2007-09-26 
5 味精 中国 2007-09-05 
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